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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN SECONDARY
SCHOOLS
INTRODUCTION
Thomas Jefferson believed that ignorance and freedom could not
live together in a flourishing democracy. Today's mass education re-
flects the additional belief that education of the whole citizenry is crucial
to the political ideal of equal opportunity. In terms of numbers at least,
this dream of universal education has become a reality. The National
Education Association reports that in the 1969-70 school year, for
example, there were about 27,000 public secondary schools in the United
States enrolling 17,500,000 youngsters.1 Although until recently, school
boards presiding over this burgeoning governmental undertaking had
not been accountable for unconstitutional activity,2 references to the
need for a continuation of this policy of judicial noninterference 3 are
overshadowed by the recognition that high school pupils are full fledged
citizens4 who have attained constitutional maturity. This article will
deal with recent pronouncements on the meaning of procedural due
process in the high school context as regards the need for a hearing
before the imposition of discipline, the necessary procedural compo-
nents of such a hearing, and the need for clarity and specificity in high
school conduct codes.
Procedural due process in -the school context involves discussion of
the requirement of a hearing of timely and specific notice of charges,
of supplying names and witnesses and a chance for cross-examina-
tion of each and of the right to the presence of counsel. In addition, it
involves consideration of the void for vagueness doctrine as applicable
to school regulations and applicable Fifth Amendment rights.
THE REQUIREMENT OF A HEARING
The student's opportunity for a hearing is the most basic due process
requirement when he is faced with serious discipline, particularly ex-
pulsion, and the federal courts dealing with both the college and high
11971 New York Times Encyclopedia Almanac 519.
2 See Barnette v. Board of Education, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943).
3 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503,
507 (1969) ; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
4 "Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Constitu-
tion." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393
U.S. 503, 511 (1969); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
"Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court." It re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967). "The vigilant protection
of Constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ; Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
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school levels appear to be unanimous in requiring the school to afford
some opportunity for a hearing when dealing with expulsions.5
When the prospective discipline involved is a lengthy suspension,
the necessity of a hearing is almost as well established. One court said
it would treat a long or indefinite suspension as the equivalent of an
expulsion and within the rule requiring a hearing.6 Another court, con-
sidering the case of a twelfth grader suspended for picketing during
school hours, ordered her reinstatement on the ground that failure to
provide any hearing was a denial of due process. 7 A state court has
similarly held the exclusion of a student tantamount to expulsion to be
invalid when he is not provided the opportunity of presenting his side
of the story.8 It may, therefore, be generally said that an actual hearing
will be required when students are either expelled or suspended for
any substantial period of timeY
Thus far, however, a short suspension or imposition of other rela-
tively minor penalties does not warrant a hearing. For example, when
a ten-day suspension was imposed without specification of charges or
hearing, a U.S. district court, saying it was not dealing with "drastic
disciplinary action" but with temporary suspension, held that due proc-
ess requirements had been met:
If the temporary suspension of a high school student could not
be accomplished without first preparing specification of charges,
giving notice of hearing, and holding a hearing, or any combina-
tion of these procedures, the discipline and ordered conduct of
the educational program and the moral atmosphere required by
good educational standards, would be difficult to maintain. 10
In another case, an eight-day suspension, again without a hearing or
specification of charges, followed a student's overt, disruptive objections
to the school dress code. The applicable section of the California Educa-
tional Code did not require a hearing, and the court was satisfied that
under the circumstances, due process required no more than what had
been done."' In another case a parental conference before a temporary
5 Knight v. Board of Education, 48 F.R.D. 108, 111 (E.D. N.Y. 1969) ; Baker v.
Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Vought v.
Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969); Henderson
v. Finch, 300 F. Supp. 753 (W.D. La. 1969).6 Madera v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1967).
7 Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); see Jackson v.
Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970).
8 Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1966).
9 Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), speaking not of the
requirement of a hearing, but of constitutional guarantees in general, hasheld that the point at which disciplinary actions should be subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny is when the action involves suspension "for any period of time
substantial enough to prevent one from obtaining credit for a particular
term." Id., at 988.
10 Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517, 522 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
11 Hatter v. Los Angeles City High School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 1309, 1312 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
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suspension was held to have "amply satisfied the applicable principles
of due process .... "12
It is probably erroneous to conclude, in these instances when a
full hearing is not technically necessary, that due process requires noth-
ing. A student seemingly should have a chance to deny or explain his
conduct even when sanctions are not so drastic as to necessitate a full
hearing. The courts are not likely to consider indelible notations of
misconduct on the student's record or other real injuries implied with
discipline as insignificant. Thus, in some state court cases we find the
suggestion, by implication' 3 or by analogy,14 that due process requires
at least an administrative consultation before any future discipline is
imposed, so that the student can have the opportunity to persuade the
authority of a situation of mistaken identity or that there is some other
compelling reason not to take action. Although a prediction of judicial
interference in the school's handling of trivial matters is not intended,
it is suggested that caution be exercised to assure consistent fair treat-
ment at all stages of both major and minor discipline.
Due process unlike some legal rules is not a technical conception
with a fixed content, unrelated to time, place and circumstances.
• ..It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving
the exercise of judgment by these whom the Constitution entrust-
ed the unfolding of its process.
15
Thus, at disciplinary hearings:
Minimum procedural requirements necessary to satisfy due proc-
ess depend upon the circumstances and the interests of the parties
involved. 6
Well before the Constitution became generally recognized as a
necessary guide in a school's treatment of pupils, a Pennsylvania court
gave generous content to the meaning of the statutory phrase "after a
proper hearing", in discussing the expulsion of students:
A proper hearing can only be one held after an accused has had
due and reasonable notice of the nature of the offense charged,
the names of his accusers, the time and place where he may if
12Schvartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238, 241 (E.D. N.Y. 1969).
13R.R. v. Board of Education, 263 A.2d 180, where the court in a temporary
suspension case suggested, at 186, the propriety of a preliminary hearing even
though a full hearing was subsequently held; Banks v. Board of Pub. Instr.,
314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970) where the court, at 294, implicitly approved
the reported practice of a preliminary informal discussion with the student
and his parents, although again the penalty was not minor and a full hearing
was held after the suspension.
1 Kelly v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 293 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Tenn.
1968) where the court required some form of hearing before the Board could
suspend all students from interscholastic athletic competition for one year.
15 Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-3 (1951),
(concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
16 Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); see also,
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Zanders
v. Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968) ; Madera v. Board
of Education, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967).
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he desires appear before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the
matter in question, and there be given opportunity to face his
accusers, to hear their testimony, examine any and all witnesses
testifying against him, have the right to offer testimony in his
own behalf by himself and his witnesses if he so desires, and to be
represented by counsel if he so elects.1
7
The federal courts have not seen fit to implement such an elabo-
rate list of procedures. It has become generally accepted that a
trial, identical to that in a court of law, need not be provided at
expulsion hearing.:'
At the same time, the hearing is to be more than an informal interview,
and, as the cases disclose, should have the character of an adversary
proceeding.' 9
The college case of Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education20
is the landmark on student's procedural rights and remains an excel-
lent reference point. The case involved an ex parte expulsion of stu-
dents without notice of charges or opportunity to appear. The federal
court set aside the school's action as unconstitutoinal and, in so doing,
delineated the meaning of due process in expulsion cases. As will be
detailed later, the role in the Dixon case can be considered generally
applicable to secondary level expulsions. Dixon required:
(1) That accused students should have notice of the charges against
them and opportunity to be heard in their own defense. More specifi-
cally, "the notice should contain a statement of the specific charges and
grounds which, if proven, would justify expulsion" under appropriate
regulations.
21
(2) That the required hearing must afford the authorities "an
opportunity to hear both sides in considerable detail.... This does not
imply that . . . the right to cross-examine witnesses is required."
However, under some circumstances the accused student "should be
given the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written
report on the facts to which each witness testifies".
2 2
(3) That a student's right to defend himself should include
the opportunity to "produce either oral testimony or written affiidavits
of witnesses in his behalf.
23
' Geiger v. Milford Independent School Dist., 51 Pa. D. & C. 647, 6 Mon. Leg.
R. 73 (1944).
is Madera v. Board of Education, 386 F.2d 778, 786 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Zanders v.
Board of Education, 281 F. Supp. 747, 749 (W.D. La. 1967); Due v. Florida
A & M University, 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Dixon v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 194 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961).
19 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
20Id.
21294 F.2d at 158.
22 Id. at 159.
2Id.
.MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
(4) That if the hearing is not a tete-a-tete with authorities, "the
results and findings of the hearing should be presented in a report open
to the student's inspection.
2 4
Reference to the above listing provides a convenient method of
analyzing existing authority and projecting the possible development
of the law.
SPECIFIC NOTICE OF CHARGES
As announced in Dixon, the rudiments of constitutional fairness
require that a student be formally and specifically informed as to his
alleged misconduct. This enables him, if the charge is not true, to pre-
pare to demonstrate its fallacious character or, if it is true, to explain
any mitigating circumstances involved.
As to the notice itself, a formal recitation of specific charges of the
grounds for expulsion has been required as a matter of course in
college cases. 25 At least one high school case suggests that this will be
the requirement in secondary school expulsions.2
6
As to the timing of this notice, the trend is toward furnishing the
same at a reasonable time before the hearing, although this view has
not been unanimous. Two federal courts in Tennessee have indicated
that being advised of the charges for the first time upon appearing be-
fore school authorities is not a violation of procedural due process.27
It seems obvious, however, that if prior notice is not given, the student
is not afforded a period in which to gather either his wits or his evidence
before appearing in front of the board. Specification of some standard
fairly requires "timely" notice of ,the charges. One court, dealing with
a college student, has suggested that the student be furnished with a
written statement of charges at least ten days before the hearing.
28
Another, involving a high school pupil, has found a two-day notice to
be adequate.
2 9
FACT FINDING AT THE HEARING
A. The Names and Cross-Examination of Witnesses
A series of school cases both on the college and secondary level have
followed Dixon's lead in requiring the disclosure of the names of wit-
nesses and the facts which they supply. 0 Although no high school expul-
24 Id.
25 Scott v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Ala. 1969);
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note 19.
26 Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
27 Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970) ; Jones v. State Bd.
of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), aff'd 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. granted 396 U.S. 817 (1970), but dismissed, 397 U.S. 31 (1970).
28 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
29 Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Ill. 1970).
30 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, supra note 25: Hobson v. Bailey,
supra note 27; Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968) ; Jones v.
State Bd. of Educ., supra note 27; Zanders v. Board of Education, supra
note 16.
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sion case can be found setting aside an expulsion for refusal to supply
the names of witnesses, that result is foreseeable on the basis of the
Dixon precedent.
The confrontation and cross-examination of these witnesses has
been treated differently by the courts. Unquestionably, an evidentiary
hearing with the availability of cross-examination affords the oppor-
tnity of asking "probing questions" [which] "often uncover inconsis-
tencies, lapses of recollection and bias."3 1 Some courts, influenced by
arguments to this effect, guarantee cross-examination as a matter of
right.3 2 But the majority of courts thus far have chosen to support the
rule not requiring the opportunity of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion of witnesses. 3
On the high school level there arguably is wisdom in such a rule,
particularly where the "informer" is a fellow student. In 1942, a state
court expressed its opposition to exposing such students to derision, and
said that although:
The student should be informed ... of the .. . names of at
least principal witness against him when requested ... He cannot
claim the privilege of cross-examination as a matter of right....
As to the right to meet his accusers face to face in an investiga-
tion of wrongdoing, we cannot fail to note that honorable students
do not like to be known as snoopers and informers against their
fellows. . .. In these circumstances they should not be subjected
to a cross-examination, and, as is often seen in a trial court, to
their displeasure if not their public humiliation. It would be sub-
versive to the best interests of the school, as well as harmful to
the community.
34
rhe majority of courts are likely to continue to deny the existence of the
right of confrontation and cross-examination in furtherance of the judi-
cial goal of an orderly administration of the school system.
B. The Right to Counsel
Related to tthe question of confrontation and cross-examination is
the question of the right to have an attorney present at the hearing as a
capable questioner, or as a counselor. A Florida court interpreted the
Dixon ruling, which omitted mention of any right to counsel, as denying
the existence of any such right:
A fair reading of the Dixon case shows that it is not necessary
to due process requirements that a full-scale judicial trial be con-
ducted by a university discipline committee with qualified attor-
neys either present or waived. 5
31 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497-98 (1959).
32 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, supra note 25; Buttny v. Smiley,
supra note 30.33 Memorandum on Judicial Standards in Review of Student Discipline, 45
F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
3 State ex tel Sherman v. Hyman, 171 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tenn. 1942) cert.
denied 319 U.S. 748 (1943).3 5 Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963).
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The Supreme Court has made it clear that there is no attendant con-
stitutional right to counsel when an administrative body performs a
merely investigatorial function.'6 However, a committee empowered to
expel or suggest the expulsion of a student based upon its findings is
improperly characterized as having merely investigatorial functions.
Perhaps for this reason, cases can be found requiring, or permitting
at least, the passive presence of counsel .3
With the recent Gault3 8 and Kent39 decisions, the Supreme Court
has twice in as many years insisted on a juvenile's right to counsel,
reasoning that:
The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with the
problems of the law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to
insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain where
he has a defense and to prepare and submit it."
Implicit in these rulings is the suggestion that the less able a person is
to express his position, the more important his right to be properly
heard through counsel becomes. Therefore, although a college student
may be capable of effectively presenting his side at a disciplinary pro-
ceeding,4' the student of high school age may be less articulate and less
able to handle his own defense.
One consideration relevant to the necessity of councel's presence is
the severity of the penalties involved. The scar of an expulsion or even
a suspension on an academic record, substantially limiting professional
and educational opportunities, is a deep one. One District Court in
Madera v. Board of Education,42 focused on the ramifications of the
hearing and commented that the process
can ultimately result in loss of personal liberty to a child or
in suspension which is the functional equivalent of his expulsion
from the public schools or in the withdrawal of his right to
attend public schools.4
In a New York state court, a high school senior was held to have a
right to counsel in order to face a charge of cheating, a statutory mis-
demeanor, where consequences could have been denial of a diploma.
36 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); Greene v. McElroy, supra note 31;
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957) ; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) ; Wasson
v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp.
228 (S.D. W.Va. 1968), aff'd 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. den. 394
U.S. 905 (1959).
'3 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, supra note 25; Jones v. State Bd.
of Educ., supra note 27; Zanders v. Board of Education, supra note 18;
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D. N.Y. 1968);
Scott v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., supra note 25.
3sin re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
39 Kent v. U.S., 388 U.S. 541 (1966).
40 In re Gault, supra note 38.
4'Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
42267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), reVd 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
den. 390 U.S. 1028 (1968).
.3 267 F. Supp. at 369.
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Under these circumstances, the court concluded that denial of active
participation by counsel was arbitrary.4
4
It is true that expulsion hearings are not exclusively punitive actions
nor criminal proceedings. Clearly such hearings will not be allowed
to become full-blown trials. Nevertheless, even though the strict rules
of evidence will not govern the proceeding,45 where there is a dispute
of fact it is to be of an adversary nature.4"
Projection of the considerations outlined above suggests the in-
creased acceptance of a rule permitting, and, under some circumstances,
requiring the presence of counsel.
C. The Right Against Self-Incrimination
The right against self-incrimination is generally associated with
criminal, not administrative matters. Nevertheless, students are faced
with two potential situations where Fifth Amendment rights may be
operative. The first is under circumstances where a student's pre-
hearing statements are used against him although he was not apprised
of their potentially incriminating character. A New York state court
in Goldwyn47 equivocated when faced with the problem, giving assur-
ance that a citizen may not be deprived of Fifth Amendment rights in
an administrative proceeding,48 including a disciplinary hearing, but
explaining that certainly the Miranda warning is not required.49
The second potential situation involves a student charged with a
crime who finds himself on the school disciplinary carpet before the
disposition of the criminal matter. The student thus risks expulsion if
he remains silent and risks prejudicing his chances of success in any
subsequent criminal proceedings if he speaks. A New York state court
rejected Fifth Amendment claims under similar circumstances. The
court said it would not countenance the absurdity of a rule which would
give a child charged with a crime a constitutional right to remain in
school and not be subject to a school hearing until disposition of the
criminal matter, but which would subject a child charged with mere
44 Goldwyn v. Allen, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899, 54 Misc. 2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1967). The
Goldwyn case has been cited via dictum as authority for right to counsel in
situations with severe discipline as a potentiality: People ex rel Granelley v.
Krueger, 310 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (1970). Other state jurisdictions can be
found holding that fundamental fairness requires the appearance of counsel
for secondary school students at serious misconduct hearings. Morrison v.
City of St. Lawrence, 186 'Mass. 456, 72 N.E. 91 (1904) ; Hollenbach v. Eliza-
bethtown School Dist., 18 Pa. D. & C. 2d 196 (Lancaster County Ct. 1958);
Mande v. Wesleyville School Dist., 81 Pa. D. & C. 125 (Erie County Ct.
1952); Geiger v. Milford Indep. School Dist., 51 Pa. D. & C. 647 (Monroe
County Ct. 1944).
45 Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Reptr.
463 (1967) ; Madera v. Board of Education, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967).
46 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
-1 Goldwyn v. Allen, supra note 44.
4s Citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1966); Spevack v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511 (1966) ; Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1955).
49 Goldwyn v. Allen, supra note 44.
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misconduct, to which the right against self-incrimination does not apply,
to immediate disciplinary action.50
New York precedent on Fifth Amendment student rights
must be understood in the context of the somewhat typical
situation of legislative integration of school and juvenile law.
There is no reason to believe, however, that the courts would not
be willing to adopt Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimi-
nation as appropriate in light of the genuine and serious injury
suggested by an expulsion or lengthy suspension.
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF PROHIBITED CONDUCT
Another procedural due process consideration is that of notice to
the student that specific behavior was prohibited and would subject
him to discipline. The Constitution requires that particularly criminal
statutes be definite, that is, not in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must guess at their meaning.-" As to school rules, the void
for vagueness doctrine is generally accepted and the standard of fair
notice is similar:
The criterion for judging whether a regulation or statute is too
vague is that of fair notice to those governed by the regulation.5
2
While the vagueness test is well established, the federal courts in
the relatively new school area have marked out two distinguishable
lines of constitutional reasoning as to precision or even publication
thereby required of regulatory standards. One line of reasoning can
be found in the en banc General Order of Student Discipline emphasiz-
ing the comprehensive authority of school officials in the matter of
regulation:
Outstanding educational authorities . .. believe on the basis of
experience, that detailed codes of prohibited student conduct
are provocative and should not be employed .... The legal doc-
trine that a prohibitive statute is void if it is overly broad or
unconstitutionally broad does not in the absence of special edu-
cational circumstances, apply to the standards of student conduct
. . . [which] ordinarily should be determined by recognized
educational standards.5
3
50 People ex rel Granelle v. Kreuger, 310 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1970).
51 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).52Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified School Dist., 319 F. Supp. 368, 370 (E.D. Cal.
1970) ; see also American Comm. Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1951) ;
but see Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D.
Tex. 1969) and Banks v. Board of Public Inst., 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla.
1970), explaining the general law that such rules need not be drawn as tightly
as criminal statutes.
53 45 F.R.D. 133, 146-47 (W.D. Mo. 1968), indicates that the court in the context
of its statement could have substituted "vague" for the term "overly broad."
The cases generally support the position that school administrators properly
have wide latitude in formulating rules and guidelines of student conduct.
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 832 (D. Conn. 1970) ; Farrell
v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Me. 1970); Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified
School Dist., supra note 52; Bouse v. Hipes, 319 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Ind.
1970) ; Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., supra note 27. The United States Supreme
Court has consistently prescribed this attitude of deference: "The Court has
[Vol. 54
DUE PROCESS IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS
This judicial approach, which recognizes minimal notice as constitu-
tionally edequate, leads to decisions such as Buttny v. Smiley,5" where
the court upheld a regulation which required students to "conduct them-
selves in such a manner that reflects credit upon the university." Simi-
larly, an Illinois statute which warned of discipline for "gross disobedi-
ence or misconduct" has been upheld as not unconstitutionally vague . 5
One court has allowed a suspension not exceeding one school term based
upon violation of a Texas statute which provided that penalty for "in-
corrigible conduct."56
A second line of cases is exemplified by Soglin v. Kauffman.57
The district court explicitly took issue with the view expressed in the
General Order of Student Discipline:
The constitutional doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth are
applicable in some measure to the standard or standards to be
applied . . . in disciplining students and that [sic] a regime in
which the term 'misconduct" serves as the sole standard violates
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by reason
of vagueness . . .5
Upon similar reasoning, one court in a well-written opinion has decided
that "generalities can no longer serve as standards of behavior when
an education hangs in the balance" 59 Thus, a second group of courts
appears quite ready to set aside expulsions based upon indefinite or
uncertain regulations, and will require precise and narrowly drawn
rules.
Just as there are at least two dissimilar interpretations of the
appropriate vagueness standard applicable to school regulations, the
courts differ on the adequacy of even necessity of publication of the
disciplinary rule before students may be severely punished. The appel-
late court in Soglin, for example, required a published rule to satisfy
notice requirements
Pursuant to appropriate rule or regulation, the University has
the power to maintain order by suspension or expulsion of dis-
ruptive students.... We only hold that expulsion and prolonged
suspension may not be imposed on students by a university simply
on the basis of allegations of "misconduct" without reference to
any pre-existing rule which supplies an adequate guide."0
repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of
the states and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
-54281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).
55 Whitfield v. Simpson, supra note 29.
56 Southern v. Board of Trustees, 318 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
57295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
58 295 F. Supp. at 990.
59 Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1346 (S.D. Tex.
1969); see also, Brownlee v. Board of Education, 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D.
Tenn. 1970).
60 Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1969); see also Hammond
v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967).
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A different interpretation of the publication requirement is expressed
in Speake v. Grantham, 61 another college case, indicating a preference
for but not necessity of publication:
• . . an institution may establish appropriate standards of con-
duct, both scholastic and behavioral, in any form and manner
reasonably calculated to give adequate notice to the scholastic
attainments and behavior expected of the student. The notice
of these standards may be written or oral, or partly written and
partly oral, but preferably written and may be positive or nega-
tive in form. 62
Apparently some courts are willing, however, under some circumstances,
to uphold disciplinary action despite the lack of a published rule. For
example, one court upheld a one-year probation and suspension of social
and athletic privileges of high school students who had been drinking
beer, although use of alcohol was not explicitly prohibited. The court
permitted punishment without a prior rule upon consideration of prior
knowledge of wrongfulness of the conduct and of the severity of the
penalty imposed. 63 Were the penalty more severe or the censure more
of a surprise, the court might well have decided differently.
There is general agreement then that, especially when serious penal-
ties are involved, the vagueness standard is in some manner operative
so as to guarantee the student adequate notice of behavioral standards.
Although clearly school rules need not be as narrowly drawn as
criminal statutes, 64 and although there remains a question as to the
applicability of any vagueness standard where less seriousness penalties
are involved, 65 there is a discernable trend toward requiring the school
to formulate objective and precise definitions of conduct which may
lead to serious disciplinary action.
When faced with such drastic consequences, a high school stu-
dent has no less a right to clear, specific normative statement
61317 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Miss. 1970).
62 Id., at 1270. Other college cases supporting the rule that a school administra-
tion under its inherent authority may severely punish students without a
prior published rule are: Norton v. Discipline Committee, 419 F2d 195 (6th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 906 (1970); Esteban v. Central Missouri
State College, supra note 25; Jones v. State Board of Education, supra note 27;
Barker v. Hardway, supra note 36. The First Circuit in dictum indicated that
it was inclined to this view in Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir.
1970).
63 Hasson v. Boothby, 318 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Mass. 1970).
64 Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
65The District Court in Soglin left unresolved the problem of whether the
vagueness doctrine should apply at school proceedings 'in which the range of
possible sanctions is mild, such as the denial of social privileges or a minor
loss of academic credits or perhaps expulsion from a specific course or per-
haps a brief suspension." 295 F. Supp. at 991. In addition, one should recog-
nize that the principles of Soglin and other college cases arguably have a
more limited application in a high school situation, where even greater dis-
cretion is properly lodged in school officials and where flexibility in school
administration may be even more desirable.
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• . . than does a university student or possibly the accused in a
criminal case.66
CONCLUSION
In 1971, we find ourselves in the pioneer period of school constitu-
tional law. Procedural due process is the newly recognized but clearly
applicable guarantee of fundamental fairness to students subject to
school discipline. With the prospect of serious discipline, the sine qua
non of fair treatment is the opportunity of a hearing. What remains
less well-defined is the description or even the necessity of other consti-
tutional safeguards. However, projection of existing constitutional and
school law suggests a future law which will stabilize somewhat beyond
the experimental borders drawn in the initial test cases. To the degree
that courts become impressed with the relative severity and implications
of student discipline, one can anticipate expansion of procedural re-
quirement to include guarantees of the right to the active or passive
assistance of counsel and the right to some form of Fifth Amendment
warning. More rigid description of the applicable vagueness standard
is correspondingly likely. On the other hand, with a view toward the
orderly administration of the school system and with confidence that
judicial lines will be drawn in the area of ever-expanding permissibility,
the required prior notice of charges is not expected to become an
approximation of a detailed criminal complaint, nor does it seem that a
full evidentiary hearing will come to mean the opportunity of confront-
ing and cross-examining witnesses.
Whatever the development, it will mean judicial insistence upon
procedural due process when the student is subject to disciplinary in-
jury. Due process is the guarantee of subjective justice. The facts and
circumstances of each case call for application not simply of a codified
set of procedures, but of basic yet flexible guidelines so as to assure
overall fairness. The challenge in the representation of schools and stu-
dents then lies not only in the understanding of constitutional precedent,
but in the evaluation of individual problems.
JOHN J. ALBERT
66 Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., supra note 64, at 1344.
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